XC SPILog Data

[patsfan]

no problem, got it running now

[tester5]

does it matter what kinda packege they get? i can get multiple spi but most ppl have only starz hbo and ondemand. what your looking for? diference between box id i was thinking only thing diferent from box to box is the unit address and checsum thing.......only thing i am thinking about is that we mabe be able to make a E11 works since we can send spi directli we dont need the unit id to pintpoint what i think is diferent is that command to let you write. maibe the checksum is what it is so if a box hadd all 000000 what would be the checsum ff?

[cipher]

hi adrianvb6,

It does not matter what categories a box is subscribed too.

The information analysis I am performing at this time is to determine what the auth sequence represents in terms of data structure. Without this information it is not possible to perform a cryptanalysis of the encrypted portions. I must know what the encrypted data represents.

In order to see what the data represents I need to see variations from different CC's which will allows me to define what portions of the auth sequence are control data and what is auth data and what clear control data is used in conjunction with the encrypted data.

The box from a system hardware view is the same, but from a software config view it is variable. The UID is common and is a network address and an XC authentication value.

For example I can spoof an address and capture an authorization from any active UID. I cannot use the auth because the signature generated by the DAC does not match in the XC device and fails to process. Even if the signature is correct, which I think it is possible to create. The unit will now process the auth but the seed key used to encrypt the stream can be one of n possibilities. So back at the DAC seed key n was set to encrypt the stream. The auth sequence configures the XC channel map to use this n key on the mpeg stream data.

It is much more complicated than what I have discussed here, but this should help see where I am going with this.

By the way I don't care about free cable or any of that shit. I do this stuff because it is stimulating and fun to do. It is an extreme challenge to accomplish. The engineering of the security of the system is well done, but it is based on DES and has some weakness from that side of it. It is subject to differential-linear cryptanalysis which Mr. Hellmann has published.

If it is cracked so be it. The CC's could use a kick in the head for their greedy behavior.

For anyone wishing to set the UID on an E11 box I would advise that you stop wishing now. Even if I found a way to set the UID I will never have the seed keys to go with it. Motorola has the keys secured properly; it is loaded from a secure TVPASS device, never over the wire. Is it possible to perform a cryptanalysis and recover them? Yes. Anyone have a Tektronic mpeg stream analyzer, you will need one and a lot of time!

As for setting the UID to 00000000 as an idea there is merit here. But the keys are lost in the process of zeroing the XC device and again this is a much more difficult path to go on. However this could be used as a learning tool. For example the patent for the XC device indicated that there is a clear mode of operation without encryption. This would likely be on by default in the zero state and could reveal some information that was previously unknown.

[cipher]

Well we have another piece of the puzzle. There are simple patterns in the 64 bit encoded section of the auth sequence. Check this out.

In a series of 16 auth sequences that I captured from the same UID the first nibble of the 64 bit area is incremented by 1 when sorted by the 64 encoded value. Here is and example of what I see.

0D739534ACD1C334
1CBDB7C4D49B41A4
25AE9E54ACD1ECC4
32945B45AD21FE34
4B6C1F68A7413865
5E54ACD1C33047E6
6C1F64EF8AA82432
7C33047548C75ADD
8EA270F6D29EC9E5
9C5E4CBC1C0CA723
A2FC4A88E93A9321
B09AD8EC7765A872
C123196A7D8EB423
DA3995C566B75343
EB451D03BA5DAD6
F3BC4A89EE3564F1

The example data is not the actual data except for the first 4 bits.

This is very very significant! The more data I get the more we will see.

[cipher]

I have performed the initial cryptanalysis of the two encoded areas of data within the auth sequence.

The 128 bit data area is definitely encrypted data and has the following characteristics.

1) It is not compressible - indication of good encryption.

2) It passes all randomness tests and has a average distribution of 0.5 which is expected for any iterative cipher like DES.

3) It yields very good evidence of ECB based DES and is probably subject to a brute force method as far as I can see. The brute force method would take a very long time without a massive network of computers working on it, that does not mean its not possible, just more complex.



The 64 bit data area in definitely not directly encrypted data and it has the following characteristics.

1) It is to short a length to perform proper randomness tests, however it is visually obvious that it is not random in a 64 bit length.

2) It is to small a value to perform compression tests, however a plurality of values together do not compress well. This indicates an average distribution of near 0.5 across multiple values.

3) There was some evidence of a cyclic behavior however I have not been able to duplicate it and it is more likely to be a signature, or a checksum of the entire auth sequence.

4) It cannot be ruled out that it is not an authentication value stemmed from an XOR with the UID and some other source.

I will now proceed to collect more data and work on the structural analysis.

[tester5]

02/17 21:51:00 :0812
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
96 70 04 55 80 5A 6A C9 4F BA AD F0 66 24

02/17 21:51:31 :0453
80 29 3C C2 59 8C 6C 80 75 30 00 00 00 20 A7 F5 1A 05 14 B8 0F 00 4C 71 DF F7 EF D7 FF E7 ED FF
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02/17 21:51:31 :0484
81 FF 4D EA FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 00 45 1C 71 DC FD 2A 24 3D 21 1C F1 DB C7 4A 90 FE
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

02/17 21:51:31 :0484
81 2B
55 00

02/17 21:51:31 :0484
00
55

02/17 21:51:31 :0500
00 00
29 0D

02/17 21:51:31 :0515
01
55

02/17 21:51:31 :0515
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
C2 59 8C 6C 80 77 EE 7A 0B 3A 1D 02 69 7B

[cipher]

adrianbv6

This is one of the most interesting sequences I have seen yet. Is there any info you know of that may indicate why it was sent to the box?

[tester5]

if you see any unit address in any posts i post xxxxx them thanx


i get theose even on a disconnected box i dont know why is on bootup tehen keeps coming more and more.

[tester5]

Thanks usbbdm and max

Here are some more interesting details.

1) The last two bytes before the checksum byte of any SPI auth sequence can change and the signed/encoded 128 bit and 64 bit areas remain unchanged.

e.g.
last line of any sequence
81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 01 ZZ ZZ CC

Green = Encoded data
Red = word that can change and is independant of the encoding
Blue = checksum of the complete sequence

2) Some CC's do not increment what I believe is the epoch version or version stamp. This seems to only be present on the very large CC's. And this make a lot of sence. The computational power of the DAC is limited and with a large number of nodes to authorize the processing load of encrypting a new set of command for each UID overloads the system.

On my CC's system they change them monthly and when it changes so does the encoded areas of the auth sequences.

Here is what is transposes to.

The first 32 bytes of any auth looks like this.

80 3C 99 70 00 00 00 CA A0 00 1D 00 00 80 XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX 02 04


Dark blue = Auth command type
Red = sequence length
Orange = epoch
Blue = Encoded data

On many CC's the epoch remains at 01

3) The 128 bit encoded data at this point looks random enough to be encrypted data, the 64 bit data area is not completely random and could be a signature, scrambled address map, Initialization Vector or Encrypted Initialization Vector.

I would be able to find more info on the structures but there has been very poor participation in SPI log submissions. And therefore the data is quite insufficient at this time.

what does sequence lengs mean what is it it purpose

[cipher]

adrianvb6,

The sequence lenght is simply the number of bytes that are in the sequence. You can calculate it. Count all the bytes and subtract the 80 3C and the 81 control bytes and you will have 99 hex or 153 dec.

It's purpose is to allow to XC processor a quick way of knowing its recieved the full sequence.

[tester5]

there are 4 sets of commands all one afhter another exept the encrypted area everything is same

sequence lenght epoch and some other i dont knwo what it is i put in red


box 1


80 3C 78 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80 3C 99 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80 3C 99 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80 3C B8 70 00 00 00 96 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx





box 2a

80 3C 99 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80 3C 99 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80 3C 78 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80 3C B8 70 00 00 00 96 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx




box 2b

80 3C 99 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80 3C 99 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80 3C 78 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
80 3C B8 70 00 00 00 96 A0 00 01 00 00 80 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx is encrypted data that data is same only on box2 a and b because area same box diferent plan...

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx area is diferent on each box even with same plan.

[tester5]

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/ ... ps46-3.pdf
http://www.infoseccorp.com/products/cdk ... _1DES.html
http://glide.stanford.edu/lxr/source/?v=openssl-0.9.7e
http://www.okiok.com/documents/white_pa ... 20Easy.pdf



http://www.cryptosys.net/des.html
http://www.cryptosys.net/CryptoSysManua ... ES_HexMode



sorry if this has been posted already some infos maibe it helps

[cipher]

I found many of these patents describe functions that the XC chip implements, even PPV's.


h**p://www.freepatentsonline.com/5671276.pdf
h**p://www.freepatentsonline.com/4613901.pdf
h**p://www.freepatentsonline.com/4864615.pdf
h**p://www.freepatentsonline.com/4712238.pdf
h**p://www.freepatentsonline.com/4634808.pdf

[tester5]

yeap sound like the one used in dct.

we do have packege ids. like the channel id 12 12 ......2 hex

and the category like i explained usbbdm i use to have a box that with old nvram the channel didnt come said not autorized but lately they included that channel in the same hbo category and now with the new vnram works. so maibe is a way to do it from nvram.! change the channel category to the one u know u have in the chip' make the box one packege....inside nvram.

[dellanave1]

I have purchased full service, with all channels open, but the spi log is diferent to the what you post, why?
All days send it to my unit...
Why four parts are diferents? Only in the final block I can see some thing like packets ( 01, 02, 03 up to 1F)
Can explain it? How I can modify it or where I can search?

If it serves to you here the transcription:
05/25 05:59:25 :0109
80 3C 99 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 00 99 ED 02 BA 7B AD 4F 72 AF 88 44 95 31 9A F9 AC 02 04
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0125
81 03 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 DF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0156
81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 DF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0187
81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 DF 00 00 00 00 00 00 E0 FF 01 94 18 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0203
81 10 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 80 00 70 2E F0 01 11 00 00 00 00 43 83 87 D9 7A 50 31 E9 01 03 20
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0203
81 A0
55 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0218
00
55

05/25 05:59:25 :0234
00 00
09 02

05/25 05:59:25 :0234
01
55

05/25 05:59:25 :0234
00 00 00
01 0A 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0296
80 3C 99 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 00 B3 83 D2 BC E8 7F 05 CC 60 67 93 68 50 19 95 D8 02 04
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0328
81 03 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 03 DF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0343
81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 DF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0375
81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 DF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0390
81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 5A 4E 00 79 DF 89 18 F0 01 03 20
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0390
81 37
55 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0406
00
55

05/25 05:59:25 :0406
00 00
09 02

05/25 05:59:25 :0421
01
55

05/25 05:59:25 :0421
00 00 00
01 0A 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0484
80 3C 78 70 00 00 00 94 A0 00 01 00 00 00 6F 04 4B 15 2B 50 9E 19 C8 E6 11 E3 1B 5A 8C 26 02 04
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0515
81 03 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 00 02 DF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0531
81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 DF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0562
81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 85 B6 F7 20 FE 2E EE 60 01 31 E9 99
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0562
00
55

05/25 05:59:25 :0562
00 00
09 02

05/25 05:59:25 :0562
01
55

05/25 05:59:25 :0562
00 00 00
01 0A 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0640
80 3C B8 70 00 00 00 96 A0 00 01 00 00 00 B1 02 90 0E C2 7C 13 11 B4 FD 24 33 DC 22 05 AF 02 04
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0656
81 03 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 1F 00 00 08 06 01 00 00 00 02 00 08 E2 03 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0687
81 00 04 00 00 00 05 00 08 02 06 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 09 00 00 00 0A 00 00 00 0B 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0703
81 00 00 0C 00 00 00 0D 00 00 00 0E 00 00 00 0F 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 11 00 00 00 12 00 00 00 13
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0734
81 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 15 00 00 00 16 00 00 00 17 00 00 00 18 00 00 00 19 00 00 00 1A 00 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

05/25 05:59:25 :0750
81 1B 00 00 00 1C 00 00 00 1D 00 00 00 1E 00 00 00 1F 00 00 00 38 5B 6A EB A1 95 ED 48 01 00 00
55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00